Safety evalution of cryptography modules within safety related control systems for railway applications by Franekova, Maria & Vyrostko, Marek
CONTROL ENGINEERING  VOLUME: 9 | NUMBER: 2 | 2011 | JUNE 
 
© 2011 ADVANCES IN ELECTRICAL AND ELECTRONIC ENGINEERING 103 
SAFETY EVALUATION OF CRYPTOGRAPHY MODULES WITHIN 
SAFETY RELATED CONTROL SYSTEMS FOR RAILWAY 
APPLICATIONS 
Maria FRANEKOVA1, Marek VYROSTKO1 
1Department of Control and Information Systems, Faculty of Electrical Engineering, University of Zilina, 
Univerzitna 1, 01026 Zilina, Slovakia 
 
maria.franekova@fel.uniza.sk, marek.vyrostko@fel.uniza.sk 
 
Abstract. The paper deals with the problem of safety 
evaluation of cryptographic modules used within safety-
related control system for applications with increasing 
safety integrity level. The requirements to cryptographic 
techniques in safety-related communication for railway 
application are describe. The mainly part is oriented to 
description of mathematical apparatus for an error 
probability of cryptography code with a safety code, used 
in an additional safety communication layer. The 
practical results are related with the quantitative 
evaluation of an average error probability of code word 
for Euroradio protocol recommended for communication 
in European Train Control System. 
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1. Introduction 
Nowadays in railway applications, with respect to high 
requirement to Safety Integrity Level (SIL) of an 
interlocking and a communication system, the safety of 
subsystems cannot be demonstrated by tests only, but 
also by theoretical models based on quantitative analysis 
[1], [2]. Negative influence also results from the fact, that 
a generally acceptable theoretical apparatus for risk 
analysis and safety level evaluation is missing, which 
would objectify the whole process of safety 
consideration. Reciprocity information exchange leads to 
opinion of safety certification unification. It leads to 
problems minimize by reciprocity acceptation advisement 
results. The genesis of the problem is based on the fact, 
that single countries of European space developed 
philosophical different signaling systems and interlocking 
systems too. These systems have been developed 
basically at the national level with different types of 
signals and devices. Today it is very difficult to 
harmonize these devices. 
Developing the uniform ETCS (European Train 
Control System) in Europe can solve these problems in 
the future, although implementation of particular 
application level of ETCS depends on economical 
situation in individual European country [3], [4]. 
Application level ETCS L2 assumes communication 
across GSM-R (Global System for Mobile - for Railway) 
network and communication protocol Euroradio, which 
content some cryptography mechanisms for keeping of 
integrity and authentication procedures of railway 
transport entities, e. g. communication between OBU (On 
Board Unit) in train with RBC (Radio Block Central) and 
communication between RBC-RBC [5]. In several part of 
cryptography systems within ETCS system is in the phase 
of evolution and discussions.  Concerning to very 
dynamic developed discipline (as it is cryptography) and 
with related cryptanalysis several recommended 
cryptography algorithm in Euroradio system is not 
computationally safety just now (not resistant against 
existing attacks) [6]. Therefore it is necessary to create 
the methodology for safety evaluation of the 
cryptographic algorithms or the cryptographic modules 
and to determine computationally safety of recommended 
cryptographic mechanisms, to consider their selection and 
in addition to proposal for these algorithms KMS (Key 
Management System). In Europe countries this time KMS 
is in the phase of developing. With respect of 
interoperability in railway transport in European 
countries these procedures and convention must be solved 
incorporate with railway companies in Europe [3]. The 
reciprocal acceptance an interlocking and communication 
systems safety appraisal results bring considerable 
financial savings and significantly reduce the deployment 
of new systems into railway operation (the necessary 
requirement for interlocking system implementation is a 
positive result of Safety appraisal). In addition more 
suitable conditions are created for penetration of these 
systems onto third-party countries (the reference of the 
systems safety being accepted by several countries 
organizations acts positively).  
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These rules are valid for specific part of safety 
related systems too, which is communication. It is well 
known that standards for commercial sphere (e. g. 
financial sector, company information systems, ...) exist 
but for applications of cryptography with increasing 
safety integrity level the methodology for safety 
evaluations absent.  E. g. the FIPS 140-2 [7] standard is 
applicable to all federal agencies that use cryptographic-
based security systems to protect sensitive information in 
computer and telecommunication systems. For safety 
evaluation of cryptography modules methods based on 
the quantitative analyses are recommended in comparison 
of approach apply in the commercial sphere, where the 
methods are based on the qualitative analyses.  
According to standard FIPS PUB 140-2 
cryptographic modules are divided to four qualitative 
levels: 
 Security Level 1 - provides the lowest level of 
security. No specific physical security 
mechanisms are required in cryptographic module 
beyond the basic requirement for production-grade 
components. 
 Security Level 2 – improves upon the physical 
security mechanisms of a cryptographic module 
by requiring features that show evidence of 
tampering, including tamper-evident coatings or 
seals that must be broken to attain physical access 
to the plaintext cryptographic keys and critical 
security parameters (CSPs) within the module. 
 Security Level 3 – attempts to prevent the intruder 
from gaining access to CSPs held within the 
cryptographic module. Physical security 
mechanisms required are intended to have a high 
probability of detecting and responding to 
attempts at physical access, use or modification of 
the cryptographic module, trusted channel for 
manipulation of critical data – B1 according to 
TCESEC [8] are used. 
 Security Level 4 – provides the highest level of 
security. The physical security mechanisms 
provide a complete envelope of protection around 
the cryptographic module with the intent of 
detecting and responding to all unauthorized 
attempts at physical access. 
General requirement to cryptography techniques 
which must be fulfill are described in the norm EN 50159 
[9]. 
2. Requirements for Cryptography 
Mechanisms within Safety 
Critical Applications 
Cryptographic techniques are recommended to apply 
within safety-related application (e. g. safety-related 
control system in railway transport) if malicious attacks 
within the open transmission network cannot be ruled 
out. This is usually the case when safety-related 
communication uses a public network, a radio 
transmission system and a transmission system with 
connections to public networks. Cryptographic 
techniques can eliminate masqueraded of message. 
Cryptographic techniques can be combined with the 
safety encoding mechanism or provided separately. The 
degree of effectiveness of cryptography mechanism 
depends on the strength of the algorithms and the secrecy 
of the keys. According to norm for railway applications 
[9] the safety case shall demonstrate the appropriateness 
of  the following: technical choice of cryptographic 
techniques (performance of encryption algorithm, key 
characteristics), technical choice of cryptographic 
architectures (checking the correct functioning - before 
and during the operational phase of the cryptographic 
processes when they are implemented outside the safety-
related equipment), management activities (production, 
storage, distribution and revocation of confidential keys). 
The cryptographic algorithm shall be applied to all user 
data and may be applied over an additional data that is 
not transmitted but is known to the sender and the 
receiver (implicit data). The basic principle of safety - 
related communication between two safety-related 
equipment SRE 1 and SRE 2 is illustrated in Fig. 1. The 
additional safety layer, certificated in the required safety 
integrity level (SIL) must be implemented within a safety 
- related equipment. It is layer of the safety - related 
transmission in which is implemented the safety 
mechanism a safety code for elimination of unintentional 
attack affected by EMI (Electromagnetic Interferences) 
and the safety layer the access protection, which is 
realized with the use of cryptographic code, or 
cryptographic techniques. This layer can be component 
part of safety – related equipment or can be apply in input 
point to untrusted transmission systems. According to 
norm [9] within safety - related communication across 
open transmission system, in which is not possible to 
eliminate unauthorized access to system, within  
communication layer of the access protection the block 
cipher based on secret key is high recommended (model 
of structure message B0) or cryptography code (model of 
structure message B1). 
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Fig. 1: Location of cryptographic module within communications between two safety - related equipment. 
3. Mathematical Apparatus for 
Error Probability Determination 
of Cryptographic Code Word 
We assume that safety communication layer, as it is 
illustrated in Fig. 2, will be combined with safety and 
cryptography code. Further let us assume that 
conventional block cipher will by apply as cryptography 
code and communication channel is affected by 
electromagnetic interferences only. 
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Fig. 2: Combined case of creating safety communication layer. 
In the conventional block cipher, a plaintext block 
of n total bits, usually comprising an integral number of 
code words of k bits each, is enciphered by cryptography 
encoder, as a block of n total bits. After transmission and 
reception, the plaintext block is restored as the output the 
output of the deciphering system. No output words are in 
error unless the received cipher text block contains an 
error in at least one of n bits. Assuming the independence 
of input bit errors, 
 ])1(1)[( nbcw PbewPP  , (1) 
where )( bewP
 
is the probability of an error in an output 
word, given that there is a block error at the input of the 
cryptography decoder (deciphering system). Setting 
1)( bewP  [10], we obtain: 
 bnbcw nPPP  )1(1 . (2) 
Due the one one-to-one correspondence between 
the ciphertext blocks, an error in a received ciphertext 
block is certain to cause at least one erroneous bit in 
output block. Consequently, over the ensemble of block 
cipher of size n, there are )12( n  equally like output 
blocks corresponding to an erroneous ciphertext block. 
Consider any fixed bit in these output blocks. In )12( 1 n  
of the possible output blocks, this bit is correct, that is, in 
the same state that it would have been in if no error had 
occurred in enciphered block. We conclude that given a 
block error, there is an ensemble-average probability that 
a bit is correct equal to )12/()12( 1  nn . Consider a 
second fixed output bit. Given that there is a block error 
and that the first fixed output bit is correct, it follows 
from an extension of the previous reasoning that there is 
an ensemble-average probability that the second fixed bit 
is correct equal to )12/()12( 12   nn . If x1, x2, …, xk are 
events, the probability of all these events is equal to the 
product of conditional probabilities: 
 )()()...,...,(,...,,( 1121121 xPxxPxxxPxxxP kkk  . (3) 
Using this equation and repeating the analysis for 
successive output bits, we conclude that for a k-bit word 
contained within a single block, 
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Combining this relation with (1), we obtain the 
ensemble-average cryptographic word error probability 
for block ciphers, 
 ])1(1)[21()21( 1 nbkncw PP   . (5) 
A Taylor-series expansion yields 
 bkncw nPP )21()21( 1   . (6) 
Which is accurate if 
 1)1(2  nPb . (7) 
The ensemble-average cryptographic bit error 
probability for block ciphers is obtained by setting k = 1 
in (5) or (6). Although these equations hold for kn  , it 
is usually required that kn 4  [10], [11] to safeguard 
against the frequency analysis of block patterns. 
The preceding derivations of cryptographic error 
probabilities depend upon the assumption of independent 
bit errors at the input of to the deciphering system. When 
this input is the output from a decoding system that 
corrects word errors, the input bit errors are not 
independent, but occur in clusters. Thus the preceding 
equations for the cryptographic error probabilities do not 
apply. However, assuming the independence of the input 
word errors, we can relate the word errors; we can relate 
the word error probabilities at the outputs of deciphering 
systems to the word error probabilities at the inputs. This 
assumption is valid when block codes are used for error 
correction and the symbol errors at the input to the 
decoding system are independent. 
For block ciphers yield 
 wknwcw Pk
nPP  /)1(1 . (8) 
Where Pw is word error probability, then 
 ])1(1)[21()21( /1 knwkncw PP   , (9) 
where the integer n/k is the number of words in a block. 
A Taylor-series expansion yields the approximation: 
 wkncw Pk
nP )21()21( 1   . (10) 
Which is accurate if 
 1)(2  knkPw . (11) 
4. Result of Error Probability 
Determination with Application 
to Euroradio Protocol 
Determination of an average error probability of the 
cryptography code word was realized for combined 
communication system, which consists from the safety 
code and the cryptographic code MAC (Message 
Authentication Code) [12]. The formal notation of MAC 
calculation is: 
 )(MCMAC Kc , (12) 
where M is the message, Kc is the shared key and C 
representing ciphering operation. 
This alternative cryptographic technique is well 
recommended for using in Euroradio safety layer of 
communication protocol within ETCS system, developed 
in railway application in Europe. This cryptography code 
is recommended to apply in CBC (Cipher Block 
Chaining) mode CBC-MAC, which improves the safety 
of algorithm [13]. 
CBC-MAC is based on 3-DES block cipher [14], 
which enciphered the block size of length k = 64 bits with 
applying the secret keys of length 168 bits and is using in 
secure procedures ensuring message authentication and 
integrity during transmission.  
Let us assume that the safety code is detection 
cyclic linear block code works in the principle of CRC 
(Cycling Redundancy Check) - CRC-16. Further we 
assume that probability of undetected error of code word 
Pw = 2-16 (according to norm [9], so called the worst 
case). The ensemble-average cryptographic word error 
probability cwP was realized according to relation (10). 
The results of cwP  for different length of code word in 
the input of ciphering encoder (k = 64, 128, 192, 256) and 
different length of input plaintext (n = 1.104, 5.104, 1.105, 
5.105, 1.106, 5.106) are illustrated in Tab. 1 and Tab. 2.  
Graphical results of cwP  as function of input bit 
stream of plaintext n for constant value of code words in 
input of cryptography decoder is illustrated in Fig. 3. 
In the graph illustrated in Fig. 4 we can shown 
how is changed cwP  dependence of code words k = 64, 
k = 128 and k = 256 in the input of cryptography encoder.
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Tab.1: Result of the average error probability with using cryptography 
code in accordance with parameter n. 
Length of 
input 
plaintext n 
Average 
error 
probability 
cwP if   k=64 
Average 
error 
probability 
cwP if k=128 
Average 
error 
probability 
cwP if k=256 
1,104 3,13·10-14 1,56·10-14 7,81·10-15 
5,104 1,56·10-13 7,81·10-14 3,91·10-14 
1,105 3,13·10-13 1,56·10-13 7,81·10-14 
5,105 1,56·10-12 7,81·10-13 3,91·10-13 
1,106 3,13·10-12 1,56·10-12 7,81·10-13 
5,106 1,56·10-11 7,81·10-12 3,91·10-12 
 
Fig. 3: Caption example. 
Tab.2: Result of average error probability with using cryptography 
code in accordance with parameter k. 
Length of input 
block k 64 128 192 256 
Average error 
probability cwP  
3,13· 
10-14 
1,56· 
10-14 
1,04· 
10-14 
7,81· 
10-15 
 
Fig. 4: Average error probability of the cryptography code in 
dependence on k. 
This is simulation of changing cryptography 
algorithms  DES or  3-DES to today resistant block 
cipher to known cryptanalytic attacks AES (Advanced 
Encryption Standard) [15] for constant length of plain 
text n = 104. 
5. Conclusion 
In the paper the mathematical apparatus for an error 
probability of cryptography code was describe, which can 
be used within the safety evaluation of cryptography 
codes used in safety-related communication with 
combination of a safety code. The authors assumed 
application of CRC-16 safety code. The results are 
oriented to determination of an average error probability 
of message authentication code (MAC) on the base of 3-
DES algorithm in CBC mode, which is recommended to 
apply in Euroradio communication protocol in ETCS 
system providing affect of electromagnetic interferences 
only. In Tab. 1 and Tab. 2 and in Fig. 3 and Fig. 4 are 
illustrated the results of an average error probability of 
cryptography code in dependence of length of plaintext n 
and of length of code word k (in the case of changing the 
algorithm 3-DES to more prefer algorithms AES). For 
keeping high diffusion of a cipher text it is necessary the 
length of message n choice more than selected length of 
block cipher k (n>4k is recommended). Results of an 
average error probability of code word can be changed in 
dependence on the detection or correction possibilities of 
safety code.  In the paper the authors assume one type of 
safety code only and determination oriented to safety 
analyses of cryptography code. 
For global safety evaluation of cryptographic 
module it is necessary to create the model which will be 
describe the affects of the intentional attacks to safety 
message transmission. 
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